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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROBERT REEDY,

Case No. 950638-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
In response to the issues raised in Appellant Robert Reedy's
brief on appeal, the state argues the trial court and state were
not required to provide Robert Reedy ("Reedy") with timely
service of papers initiating probation-revocation proceedings, in
order for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the matter.
Yet the plain language of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (1992) require the state and the
trial court to provide such service without exception and without
delay. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in order to be
timely, a probationer must be served with the relevant papers
before the original expiration of his probation period.

Other-

wise, the trial court may not retain jurisdiction over the
matter. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 794 (Utah 1990).
The state's argument, as set forth in the Brief of Appellee
("S.B."), disregards the plain language of the probationrevocation statute, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
relevant case law.
In this appeal, Reedy is asking this Court to reverse the
ruling of the trial court, and affirm the determination that the

state and/or trial court must serve the probationer with a copy
of the papers initiating the revocation proceedings prior to the
expiration of the probation period in order for the trial court
to retain jurisdiction over the probationer. Such a determination
is consistent with Utah statutory and case law and the due
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE ESSENTIALLY IS ASKING THIS COURT TO DISREGARD THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH CODE AND RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, AND TO ABANDON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBATION-REVOCATION STATUTE THAT IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN UTAH
CASE LAW AND CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS,
In this case, neither the state nor the trial court gave
notice to Reedy prior to the expiration of his probation period
that revocation proceedings had been commenced.

(Record on

Appeal (l!R.,f) 44-48, 53.) In May 1992, Reedy was sentenced to 18
months probation.

(R. 173-74.) His probation was scheduled to

expire by its terms in November 1993. In June 1993, Adult Probation and Parole (hereinafter "AP&P" and/or "state") filed a
violations report and affidavit alleging Reedy had "gone to
California with his father," and had failed to obtain a "Travel
Permit to leave the State of Utah."

(R. 44, 47-48.)

The report

and affidavit were not served on Reedy or his counsel of record,
Ken Brown.

(R. 44-48, 53.)

Thereafter, in June 1993, the trial court entered an order
to show cause why Reedy's probation should not be revoked and
issued a warrant for his arrest.

(R. 45-46, 53.)

Neither the

state nor the trial court served those papers on Reedy or his
counsel at any time prior to November 1993, the date his
2

probation term was originally scheduled to expire.

Almost two

years after they were filed, Reedy was served with the papers
initiating the probation-revocation proceedings. (R. 45-46.)
Reedy's probation period should have been allowed to expire
in November 1993.

At the time notice of the proceedings was

provided to Reedy, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the matter.
A. THE 1992 VERSION OF THE PROBATION-REVOCATION STATUTE AND
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT AND
STATE TO SERVE THE PROBATIONER WITH PAPERS INITIATING
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS.
The state claims that serving a probationer with papers
initiating revocation proceedings prior to expiration of the
probation period is not a condition that must be met under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1992) in order for the trial court to retain
jurisdiction over the probationer.

(S.B. at 6-8.)

Like the

current version of the probation-revocation statute, the 1992
version provides the following:
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled
upon the filing of a violation report with the court
alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show
cause or warrant by the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 7718-1(9) (1992).

According to the state, the "tolling" provision

of the statute compels the determination that the mere filing of
the papers initiating the proceedings tolls the probation period.
Yet the probation-revocation statute also provides for notice:
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging
with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court
that authorized probation shall determine if the
3

affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.

(ii) If the court
cause, it shall cause
warrant for his arrest
an order to show cause
revoked, modified,
or

determines there is probable
to be served on the defendant a
or a copy of the affidavit
and
why his probation should not be
extended.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 7718-1(10) (1992) (emphasis added).
The "tolling" provision1 and the "service" provision2
cannot be read in isolation, but must be read as part of the
whole statute.

This Court has stated, "[O]ne of the fundamental

rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in light of the general purpose it was
intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to
accomplish that objective." State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974
(Utah 1965)); see also Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 916
P.2d 344 (Utah 1996) ("[a] general rule of statutory construction
is that a statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole")
(quoting Zissi v. State Tax Com'n, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah
1992)).

The statute requires the state and/or the trial court to

serve the requisite papers, initiating the proceedings, on the
probationer in order to properly commence revocation proceedings
for the purpose of retaining jurisdiction over the probationer.
Stated another way, while the statute requires the filing of
1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (Supp. 1995) ; Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(9) (1992).
2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (b) (ii) (Supp. 1995) ; Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(10)(b)(ii) (1992).
4

a violation report or the issuance of the order to show cause
and/or warrant to begin the tolling process, logically that
process is only complete when the trial court has "cause[d] to be
serve[d] on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of
the affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should
not be revoked, modified, or extended."
1(10)(b)(ii) (1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-

The provisions of the same statute must be

read together to make sense.
Consider the logical progression of things as set forth in
the statute.

It requires filing of violation papers, either a

violation report or an "affidavit alleging with particularity
facts asserted to constitute a violation of the conditions of
probation."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(b)(i) (1992).

Next,

the statute requires the court to "determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation,
modification, or extension of probation is justified." Id. at
(10)(b)(i). Once that has been determined, the statute then
contemplates issuance by the court of a warrant for the
probationer's arrest or issuance of the order to show cause, and
service of those papers on the probationer. Id. at (10)(b)(ii).
"Service" is included in the provision that contemplates the
trial court will "determin[e] probable cause" to issue the very
papers, id. at (10)(b)(ii), that must be "filed" to trigger
tolling, id. at (9). The provisions are intertwined.

They

are meant to work together and compliment each other.

Thus,

tolling takes place only after the trial court has caused the
necessary papers to be served.

A statute should be read to
5

harmonize with its related law.

See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d

439, 468 (Utah 1988); State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah
App. 1992). In this instance, the "related law" is Section 77-181 taken as a whole, and case law interpreting the provisions of
the statute, as set forth in Section B, below.
In addition, the plain language of Rule 3, Utah R. Crim. P.,
requires timely service of the requisite papers:
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall be
filed with the court and served on all other
parties.
(b) Whenever service
is required
or permitted to be
made upon a party represented by an attorney,
the
service
shall be made upon the attorneyt
unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner
provided in civil actions.
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution
by the court, mail to each party a copy thereof and certify
to the court such mailing.
Utah R. Crim. P. 3 (1996) (emphasis added).

The Rule contem-

plates that service and filing will take place simultaneously.
Under those provisions, neither the state nor trial court were
relieved of the obligation to serve the relevant papers o n Reedy
and counsel when the papers were filed with the trial court.
B. UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE CONSTRUED THE "SERVICE"
PROVISION OF THE PROBATION-REVOCATION STATUTE TO MANDATE THE
TRIAL COURT TO SERVE THE PAPERS INITIATING REVOCATION
PROCEEDINGS ON THE PROBATIONER IN A TIMELY MANNER, THAT IS,
PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROBATION PERIOD.
In Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme
Court considered a "service" provision like that set forth in the
1992 version of the statute, see note 2, supra, and interpreted
the provision to require the trial court to provide notice, prior
to expiration of the probation term, to the probationer of

6

various filings initiating the revocation proceedings in order
for the court to retain jurisdiction over the matter. The court
stated, "The probationer must be served with the order to show
cause within the period of probation."

Smith, 803 P.2d at 794.

Like the 1992 version of the probation-revocation statute, the
statute in Smith emphasized the need to provide notice to the
probationer, where the papers required to be served were also
required to inform the probationer of the nature of the
allegations against him and his right to counsel and to present
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(b) and (c) (1992).
[Sjection 77-18-1 (Supp.1981) does place a significant
amount of emphasis on the nature and degree of notice to
which an individual is entitled prior to a revocation
hearing. Section 77-18-1 (5) (b) and (c) (Supp.1981) not only
states that a court "shall cause to be served on the
defendant a copy of the affidavit and order to show cause,"
but also provides that the order to show cause shall inform
the defendant of the nature of the accusations against him,
his right to counsel, and his right to present evidence. []
The emphasis on notice in section 77-18-1 (Supp.1981) is
consistent with the assertion that a court retains the
authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served
with notice of the revocation proceedings within the
probation period.
Smith, 803 P.2d at 795-96 (footnotes omitted).

The court's

decision in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988), is in
accord.
The state finds Smith to be unpersuasive because it was
decided in connection with a 1981 version of the statute that did
not include the specific "tolling" provision contained in the
1992 version of the statute. Smith, 803 P.2d at 796 n. 40; (S.B.
at 7-8) . According to the state, because the "tolling" provision
provides a mechanism for postponing the expiration of a probation
7

period, the holding in Smith construing the "service" provision
to mandate such service within the probation period is
inapplicable.

The state's interpretation of Section 77-18-1

disregards the fact that the current and 1992 versions of the
probation-revocation statute specifically retain the "service"
provision of the previous version of the statute.

In addition,

as set forth above, the plain language of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure mandate timely service. Utah R. Crim. P. 3.
The state's interpretation of the statute would permit the
trial court and state to delay providing notice indefinitely to
the probationer of the revocation proceedings.

According to the

state, there is no obligation to inform probationer or his
counsel of the initiation of the proceedings within any specified
period of time so long as the relevant papers simply have been
filed with the court.

The state's interpretation of the statute

has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court: the failure
indefinitely to provide notice to probationer of the initiation
of revocation proceedings is improper.
The assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice
within the period of probation in order for the court to
retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent with
the rationale underlying our decision in Green. If
probationers are given notice within the probation period,
there is no danger of placing them "in a state of perpetual
limbo[, where] although their probation would appear to have
terminated ... defendants would actually be subject to a
continued term of fictional supervision." [] Under such an
approach, all parties concerned would be aware of the
proceedings and the allegations underlying the proceedings
at the time the probation terminates. Probationers could
also be assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under
different grounds could be brought against them once the
probation period has ended. [] Therefore, probationers
would not be in a state of limbo where it would appear that
their probation had terminated but where further proceedings
8

could be brought against them. However, if a trial court was
able to retain authority to revoke probation without giving
notice to the probationer, there may be situations in which
it could appear that probation had ended when in fact the
court may, at some later date, reassert its jurisdiction
over the defendant for the purpose of revoking probation.
Smith, 803 P.2d at 793-94 (quoting Green, 757 P.2d at 464).
In its brief, the state has not denied that it failed to
provide timely notice to Reedy of the initiation of the
revocation proceedings.

The state fails to explain why it failed

to serve Reedy's counsel with the papers pursuant to Rule 3(a)
and (b), Utah R. Crim. P., and with the Order to Show Cause "upon
execution by the court," as mandated by Rule 3(c). The trial
court and state's failure to serve the requisite papers on Reedy
and his counsel prior to expiration of the probation period
resulted in a termination of the trial court's jurisdiction over
Reedy.

The trial court erred in proceeding with the matter two

years later.
C. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE "SERVICE"
PROVISION OF THE STATUTE COMPORTS WITH DUE PROCESS CONCERNS.
Section 77-18-1 and relevant case law are not the only
authority mandating that notice of revocation proceedings be
provided to a probationer in order for the trial court to retain
jurisdiction over probation proceedings.

The courts in Smith,

Green, and State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), have emphasized due process concerns where notice has not
been timely provided. The state has failed to address such
constitutional concerns except to say that, the "tolling"
provision in the 1992 version of the statute applies so as to
9

extend indefinitely the time in which the state and/or trial
court is required to provide notice of the proceedings to Reedy
and counsel.

Thus, since expiration of the probation period is

tolled, notice may be provided at any time.

But see Smith, 803

P.2d at 793-94 ("If probationers are given notice within the
probation period, there is no danger of placing them 'in a state
of perpetual limbo[, where] although their probation would appear
to have terminated ... defendants would actually be subject to a
continued term of fictional supervision'") (quoting Green, 757
P.2d at 464).
The state disregards the fundamental fairness and due
process concerns implicated when parties are not provided with
adequate and timely notice of proceedings.

The state's

interpretation of the probation-revocation statute would render
it unconstitutional, with seemingly no requirement that
probationers be given timely notice, as that has been defined in
Smith, of revocation proceedings.
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard
in a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural
fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah
1983) (citations omitted); accord Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d
734, 743 (Utah 1990); W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency,
802 P.2d 755, 761 (Utah App.1990). "[A]11 parties are
entitled to notice that a particular issue is being
considered by a court and to an opportunity to present
evidence and argument on that issue before decision."
Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743.
A defendant may be denied his or
her right to due process under article I, section 7, of the
Utah Constitution if adequate notice has not been given.
Id.; see also Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (notice is "'[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process'")
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950))."'
"Many cases have held that where notice is ambiguous or
inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the
10

proceedings against him [or her] or not given sufficiently
in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a partyis deprived of due process." /n Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743
(quoting Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah
1990) (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212) ) ; accord W. & G.
Co., 802 P.2d at 762.
Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069.

Furthermore,

The probationer's right to notice is necessary because "all
parties concerned would be aware of the proceedings ... at
the time the probation terminates. Probationers could also
be assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under
different grounds could be brought against them once the
probation period has ended."
[Smith 803 P.2d] at 795
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, the [Smith] court felt
that its holding was appropriate because it "guarantee[d]
the fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause
of the United States Constitution [which] entitle [s]
probationers to written notice of the accusations against
them." Id. at 795.
Even though revocation proceedings
were commenced well before the expiration of probation,
because the plaintiff was not given notice of the revocation
proceedings before the probation period expired, the court
held that the trial court lacked the authority to revoke the
plaintiff's probation and his petition for habeas corpus was
granted. Id. at 796.
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1068-69.

Statutes must be construed to comply

with constitutional framework.

State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397

(Utah 1989); see also State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah
1995); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990).
Courts should construe statutory provisions to avoid unconstitutional application of the statute, and will look to
definitions of terms and phrases in other decisions in construing
the statute.

Strawberry Electric Service Dist. v. Spanish Fork

City, 918 P.2d 870, 876-77 (Utah 1996).
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the "service"
provision of the probation-revocation statute accommodates constitutional concerns.

Smith, 803 P.2d at 794.
11

The legislature

and the Utah appellate courts consistently have found a
requirement that the state and trial courts provide timely notice
to the probationer that revocation proceedings have been
initiated.

Utah courts have consistently ruled that the

"service" provision mandates the provision of notice prior to
expiration of the original probation term in order for the trial
court to maintain jurisdiction over the probationer.

Id. The

requirement of notice prior to expiration of the probation period
affords timely notice and conforms to constitutional concerns.
Here, neither Reedy nor his counsel was provided with timely
service of the relevant papers, where the papers were served on
Reedy 18 months after his original probation period expired,
almost two years after they were filed.

The state does not

suggest that providing notice to Reedy or his counsel would have
been difficult, impractical or an impossibility.

Although the

state asserts "Reedy absconded to California" (S.B. at 9 ) , there
is no evidence in the record that would suggest he was "activelyevading supervision," Smith, 803 P.2d 794, which suggests more
than making a trip to California for the small children of his
recently deceased brother.

Rather, his supervisors were apprised

of his whereabouts (R. 44 (violations report reflects: "defendant
had gone to California with his father")), and all parties,
including the trial court and state, were aware Reedy was
represented by counsel (R. 44), who was available to receive
service of relevant filings.
The state offers no explanation for its failure to comply
12

with Rule 3, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires
parties to serve an attorney who is representing a party with
"[a]11 motions, notices and pleadings," and to "mail to each
party" a copy of an order, including an order to show cause,
"upon execution" of that order; and the clear language of Section
77-18-1, which provides that upon finding probable cause to issue
the order to show cause and/or warrant, the trial court "shall
cause to be served on the defendant" the relevant papers. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (1992); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 4
(1996) (allows warrants and summons for arrest to be "mail[ed] to
the defendant's last known address" upon execution).
Neither the trial court nor the state were relieved of the
obligation to provide timely notice within the probation period
to Reedy or his counsel concerning commencement of the probationrevocation proceedings.

The trial court erred in proceeding with

the revocation proceedings in 1995 where it lacked jurisdiction
to consider the matter.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Reedy respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the final order and declare the revocation
proceedings null and void since the trial court was without
jurisdiction to revoke Reedy's probation.
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